In his Fox interview, Mr. Clinton said âno one knew that al Qaeda existedâ in October 1993, during the tragic events in Somalia. But his national security adviser, Tony Lake, told me that he first learned of bin Laden âsometime in 1993,â when he was thought of as a terror financier. U.S. Army Capt. James Francis Yacone, a black hawk squadron commander in Somalia, later testified that radio intercepts of enemy mortar crews firing at Americans were in Arabic, not Somali, suggesting the work of bin Ladenâs agents (who spoke Arabic), not warlord Farah Aideedâs men (who did not). CIA and DIA reports also placed al Qaeda operatives in Somalia at the time.
By the end of Mr. Clintonâs first year, al Qaeda had apparently attacked twice. The attacks would continue for every one of the Clinton years.
⢠In 1994, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (who would later plan the 9/11 attacks) launched âOperation Bojinkaâ to down 11 U.S. planes simultaneously over the Pacific. A sharp-eyed Filipina police officer foiled the plot. The sole American response: increased law-enforcement cooperation with the Philippines.
⢠In 1995, al Qaeda detonated a 220-pound car bomb outside the Office of Program Manager in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing five Americans and wounding 60 more. The FBI was sent in.
⢠In 1996, al Qaeda bombed the barracks of American pilots patrolling the âno-fly zonesâ over Iraq, killing 19. Again, the FBI responded.
⢠In 1997, al Qaeda consolidated its position in Afghanistan and bin Laden repeatedly declared war on the U.S. In February, bin Laden told an Arab TV network: âIf someone can kill an American soldier, it is better than wasting time on other matters.â No response from the Clinton administration.
⢠In 1998, al Qaeda simultaneously bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224, including 12 U.S. diplomats. Mr. Clinton ordered cruise-missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan in response. Here Mr. Clintonâs critics are wrong: The president was right to retaliate when America was attacked, irrespective of the Monica Lewinsky case.
Still, âOperation Infinite Reachâ was weakened by Clintonian compromise. The State Department feared that Pakistan might spot the American missiles in its air space and misinterpret it as an Indian attack. So Mr. Clinton told Gen. Joe Ralston, vice chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, to notify Pakistanâs army minutes before the Tomahawks passed over Pakistan. Given Pakistanâs links to jihadis at the time, it is not surprising that bin Laden was tipped off, fleeing some 45 minutes before the missiles arrived.
⢠In 1999, the Clinton administration disrupted al Qaedaâs Millennium plots, a series of bombings stretching from Amman to Los Angeles. This shining success was mostly the work of Richard Clarke, a NSC senior director who forced agencies to work together. But the Millennium approach was shortlived. Over Mr. Clarkeâs objections, policy reverted to the status quo.
⢠In January 2000, al Qaeda tried and failed to attack the U.S.S. The Sullivans off Yemen. (Their boat sank before they could reach their target.) But in October 2000, an al Qaeda bomb ripped a hole in the hull of the U.S.S. Cole, killing 17 sailors and wounding another 39.
When Mr. Clarke presented a plan to launch a massive cruise missile strike on al Qaeda and Taliban facilities in Afghanistan, the Clinton cabinet voted against it. After the meeting, a State Department counterterrorism official, Michael Sheehan, sought out Mr. Clarke. Both told me that they were stunned. Mr. Sheehan asked Mr. Clarke: âWhatâs it going to take to get them to hit al Qaeda in Afghanistan? Does al Qaeda have to attack the Pentagon?â
There is much more to Mr. Clintonâs recordâhow Predator drones, which spotted bin Laden three times in 1999 and 2000, were grounded by bureaucratic infighting; how a petty dispute with an Arizona senator stopped the CIA from hiring more Arabic translators. While it is easy to look back in hindsight and blame Bill Clinton, the full scale and nature of the terrorist threat was not widely appreciated until 9/11. Still: Bill Clinton did not fully grasp that he was at war. Nor did he intuit that war requires overcoming bureaucratic objections and a democracyâs natural reluctance to use force. That is a hard lesson. But it is better to learn it from studying the Clinton years than reliving them.
Richard Miniter
