The rocket fire from Gaza at Ashkelon prompted the IDF to take the initiative. In the past 48 hours it is no longer Hamas that is escalating the fighting and determining the height of the flames based on its own needs and considerations â rather, the IDF is doing that.
The objective is to create a new erosion equation between Hamas and the IDF. Such equation would exact a much higher Hamas toll in terms of fighters and infrastructure than what was paid by the group before every time it initiated a round of escalation in the rocket terror aimed at Negev communities.
No longer do we have an Israeli military response whose strength is determined by the scope and deadliness of the Qassams as was the case so far. Nor do we see occasional operations by ground forces in the Strip and assassinations whose timing is determined by the availability of intelligence information. Now, the IDF has switched to ongoing methodical fighting from the air and on the ground deep inside the Strip.
This is indeed not the âmajor operationâ discussed in depth in the media. However, the number of troops utilized by the IDF on the ground and in the air in the framework of the current offensive is greater than before, as is the depth of the raids into the northern Strip. Givati and armored corps units are operating between the Sajaiya neighborhood and the outskirts of the Jabalya refugee camp. This area is used as a major operational and training base for Hamasâ military wing and a significant number of the Qassams directed at Gaza-region communities and particularly Sderot are fired from there.
The objective is to exact an increasingly heavy price from the military wings of Hamas and other groups operating on its behalf in the Strip. However, activity of this scope and extent would naturally exact a price from IDF troops.
For the time being, Hamas is not showing signs of collapse, yet all indications attest that its leadership is stressed and concerned. Therefore, it attempts to exert international pressure on Israel by presenting inflated civilian casualty figures. Every 15-year-old gunman hurt in the fierce battles is presented to the media as an âinnocent Palestinian boy hurt by IDF fire.â Even a one-year-old baby, who the Palestinians themselves admit was killed after a rocket exploded due to a âwork accidentâ, is presented as a victim of IDF fire.
The IDFâs offensive can develop in two different directions:
The first possibility is that in the coming days Hamas would completely or almost completely stop the rocket attacks from the Strip and propose a lengthy ceasefire through the Egyptians. If this happens, the IDF will likely also gradually minimize the scope of its offensive on the Strip.
The second possibility is that Hamas will continue to fire rockets in the current rate and scope, while the IDF continues to escalate its operations to the maximal level â that is, a major operation all across the Strip while adopting patterns the Palestinians are unfamiliar with.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3513436,00.html
The objective is to create a new erosion equation between Hamas and the IDF. Such equation would exact a much higher Hamas toll in terms of fighters and infrastructure than what was paid by the group before every time it initiated a round of escalation in the rocket terror aimed at Negev communities.
No longer do we have an Israeli military response whose strength is determined by the scope and deadliness of the Qassams as was the case so far. Nor do we see occasional operations by ground forces in the Strip and assassinations whose timing is determined by the availability of intelligence information. Now, the IDF has switched to ongoing methodical fighting from the air and on the ground deep inside the Strip.
This is indeed not the âmajor operationâ discussed in depth in the media. However, the number of troops utilized by the IDF on the ground and in the air in the framework of the current offensive is greater than before, as is the depth of the raids into the northern Strip. Givati and armored corps units are operating between the Sajaiya neighborhood and the outskirts of the Jabalya refugee camp. This area is used as a major operational and training base for Hamasâ military wing and a significant number of the Qassams directed at Gaza-region communities and particularly Sderot are fired from there.
The objective is to exact an increasingly heavy price from the military wings of Hamas and other groups operating on its behalf in the Strip. However, activity of this scope and extent would naturally exact a price from IDF troops.
For the time being, Hamas is not showing signs of collapse, yet all indications attest that its leadership is stressed and concerned. Therefore, it attempts to exert international pressure on Israel by presenting inflated civilian casualty figures. Every 15-year-old gunman hurt in the fierce battles is presented to the media as an âinnocent Palestinian boy hurt by IDF fire.â Even a one-year-old baby, who the Palestinians themselves admit was killed after a rocket exploded due to a âwork accidentâ, is presented as a victim of IDF fire.
The IDFâs offensive can develop in two different directions:
The first possibility is that in the coming days Hamas would completely or almost completely stop the rocket attacks from the Strip and propose a lengthy ceasefire through the Egyptians. If this happens, the IDF will likely also gradually minimize the scope of its offensive on the Strip.
The second possibility is that Hamas will continue to fire rockets in the current rate and scope, while the IDF continues to escalate its operations to the maximal level â that is, a major operation all across the Strip while adopting patterns the Palestinians are unfamiliar with.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3513436,00.html