IB has implemented an arbitrary 2% price cap from the previous close on every futures contract, prohibiting one from entering orders before the open above/below that level. No other futures broker does this, for obvious liability reasons. Unlike the exchanges themselves, IB's price cap bands rely on a static close price, not the indicative opening price. I ran into this on the most liquid Nikkei futures contracts just last week (August 10) when buy orders were capped to 15060 on N225, N225M, and SGXNK (Sep 2014). All three markets opened above that level, thousands of contracts traded, and IB denied one the ability to participate as a buyer on that open.
In that case, those "capped" prices would have filled after the open, but we only know that in hindsight. What if ES opens -40 on geopolitical strife over the weekend, next trade is -50? What if CL opens +2 due to a supply disruption, next trade is +3? Agricultural futures routinely open up/down limit - if you don't fill on the open, you may never fill.
If IB is using more draconian price caps than the exchanges themselves (see below), customers need to know what recourse they have if denied a fill and appropriately manage risk by replacing the denied fill at a far inferior price. That cost can easily run $1000's of dollars on a mere one lot in a limit up/limit down scenario.
Here's why these price caps are archaic - the exchanges have their own!
GLOBEX/ECBOT/NYMEX have price banding:
http://www.cmegroup.com/confluence/display/EPICSANDBOX/GCC+Price+Banding
ICE/IPE/NYBOT have reasonability limits and interval price functionality
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/futures_us/no_cancellation_range_and_reasonablity_limits.pdf
OSE.JPN has dynamic circuit breakers:
http://www.ose.or.jp/e/derivative/5378
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I implore IB to reconsider this policy specifically in futures where exchanges have their own clearly defined price caps. By all means, have TWS send a mandatory warning to customers placing such orders, but do not deny one the ability to participate in the open. Modification of customer orders without their consent is a slippery slope. It creates huge stress for the customer, and I contend in a volatile situation, it also creates significant liability for the broker.
I would be happy to discuss this at length with anyone at IB, thanks for listening.
In that case, those "capped" prices would have filled after the open, but we only know that in hindsight. What if ES opens -40 on geopolitical strife over the weekend, next trade is -50? What if CL opens +2 due to a supply disruption, next trade is +3? Agricultural futures routinely open up/down limit - if you don't fill on the open, you may never fill.
If IB is using more draconian price caps than the exchanges themselves (see below), customers need to know what recourse they have if denied a fill and appropriately manage risk by replacing the denied fill at a far inferior price. That cost can easily run $1000's of dollars on a mere one lot in a limit up/limit down scenario.
Here's why these price caps are archaic - the exchanges have their own!
GLOBEX/ECBOT/NYMEX have price banding:
http://www.cmegroup.com/confluence/display/EPICSANDBOX/GCC+Price+Banding
ICE/IPE/NYBOT have reasonability limits and interval price functionality
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/futures_us/no_cancellation_range_and_reasonablity_limits.pdf
OSE.JPN has dynamic circuit breakers:
http://www.ose.or.jp/e/derivative/5378
-----
I implore IB to reconsider this policy specifically in futures where exchanges have their own clearly defined price caps. By all means, have TWS send a mandatory warning to customers placing such orders, but do not deny one the ability to participate in the open. Modification of customer orders without their consent is a slippery slope. It creates huge stress for the customer, and I contend in a volatile situation, it also creates significant liability for the broker.
I would be happy to discuss this at length with anyone at IB, thanks for listening.