Quote from IBj:
I admit we have taken the blunt hammer approach by verifying everything even if the action is already protected under the Secure Device system.
IBj
The "blunt hammer" approach is standard IB business philosophy...
Meaning the Customer is not relevant.
As a software engineer...
My professional opinion is that IB's security follies over the last 2 years...
Are beyond JOKE.
I'm happy that IB is ** finally ** checking LARGE WIRE TRANSFERS to foreign countries via human contact...
Because, frankly, NOT doing so would certainly contravene a slew of NASD regulations...
And probably many Federal And State laws as well.
>> "have inadvertently compromised their basic password security"
This statement says more than it seems...
Because IN NO SITUATION...
Is it possible to determine ** with any certainty ** how "security was compromised".
Even though IB has > 500 mostly disgruntled employees...
And does business extensively with corrupt entities in Russia and Asia...
IB's view is that the Customer is ALWAYS the security problem.
Now I finally feel safe...
Because a Registered Person must authorize my wire transfers...
Instead of a some software coded by a revolving door of over-worked programmers.