It is very hard to know whether the disengagement proposal would increase or decrease Israel's military burden, and whether it would help or hurt its chances of survival. The conclusion can only come from comparing the possible benefits and the possible costs, each of which is uncertain and arguable. Instead of trying to think through the complicated choices, the debate has become polarized, with everyone focusing on how much he disagrees with his Israeli opponents, and with little reflection on how the proposal helps or hurts Israel's enemies.
The Military Dimension
If "unilateral separation" sharply reduced the Palestinian/Arab desire to make war against Israel, such a separation would reduce Israel's military burden. But Sharon does not claim that the proposal will bring peace; he sees it as a way to live more easily while Israel waits for the Palestinians to become willing to make peace - that is, while Palestinians are attacking Israel unless they have been given enough reason to stop doing so. Thus, after a withdrawal from Gaza, it has to be assumed that many Palestinians may continue to try to kill as many Israelis as they can. It is clearly dangerous to give them increased ability to do so.
The Ability to Control Gaza's Borders
While, ostensibly, the plan would leave Israel in control of Gaza's borders to enable it to prevent the large-scale introduction of advanced weapons and hostile elements from across the border with Egypt, from the sea, or into Gaza's airport, this is camouflage or sugar-coating reality. Since apparently Sharon's original plan would have given up control of the borders, and was only changed because of pressure from the IDF, it seems likely that he thinks the political benefits of the plan are great enough to justify giving up control of the borders, and he has been trying to find a way to get Egypt to take responsibility for controlling its border with Gaza.
If Israel retains control of the coast, the airport, and the Egyptian border, it would not really be "out of Gaza," neither militarily nor politically. There will be considerable pressures on Israel from the UN or the EU to complete the disengagement fully, even as a precondition for an international aid effort. Alternatively, if Israel then begins to suffer casualties while controlling Gaza's borders, there could be renewed political pressure to "really get out of Gaza," and it is not clear how Israel could find the political will to maintain its positions. If the history of Oslo's implementation offers any precedent, the Palestinians managed to erode many of Israel's military positions over the years that were contiguous with or inside Palestinian population centers. This was the case in Nablus with Joseph's Tomb and with the hills dominating the Jewish Quarter in Hebron. There is no reason to believe that the ultimate status of the narrow Philadelphia Corridor separating Gaza from Egyptian Sinai will be any different.
No Israeli should have any illusion that any country other than Israel could prevent large-scale smuggling of weapons and people through Gaza's borders. No Arab, American, or international force has the stomach to take the abuse and suffer the casualties required to control the borders. If Israel doesn't control the borders, they will not be controlled.
Lack of serious control of Gaza's borders would have a major impact on Palestinian military and terrorism capabilities. Higher quality explosives, anti-tank weapons, anti-helicopter and anti-aircraft weapons, long-range mortars and short-range missiles, as well as advanced communication and surveillance equipment, are all small enough to smuggle through a not-too-assiduously controlled border.
The Military Dimension
If "unilateral separation" sharply reduced the Palestinian/Arab desire to make war against Israel, such a separation would reduce Israel's military burden. But Sharon does not claim that the proposal will bring peace; he sees it as a way to live more easily while Israel waits for the Palestinians to become willing to make peace - that is, while Palestinians are attacking Israel unless they have been given enough reason to stop doing so. Thus, after a withdrawal from Gaza, it has to be assumed that many Palestinians may continue to try to kill as many Israelis as they can. It is clearly dangerous to give them increased ability to do so.
The Ability to Control Gaza's Borders
While, ostensibly, the plan would leave Israel in control of Gaza's borders to enable it to prevent the large-scale introduction of advanced weapons and hostile elements from across the border with Egypt, from the sea, or into Gaza's airport, this is camouflage or sugar-coating reality. Since apparently Sharon's original plan would have given up control of the borders, and was only changed because of pressure from the IDF, it seems likely that he thinks the political benefits of the plan are great enough to justify giving up control of the borders, and he has been trying to find a way to get Egypt to take responsibility for controlling its border with Gaza.
If Israel retains control of the coast, the airport, and the Egyptian border, it would not really be "out of Gaza," neither militarily nor politically. There will be considerable pressures on Israel from the UN or the EU to complete the disengagement fully, even as a precondition for an international aid effort. Alternatively, if Israel then begins to suffer casualties while controlling Gaza's borders, there could be renewed political pressure to "really get out of Gaza," and it is not clear how Israel could find the political will to maintain its positions. If the history of Oslo's implementation offers any precedent, the Palestinians managed to erode many of Israel's military positions over the years that were contiguous with or inside Palestinian population centers. This was the case in Nablus with Joseph's Tomb and with the hills dominating the Jewish Quarter in Hebron. There is no reason to believe that the ultimate status of the narrow Philadelphia Corridor separating Gaza from Egyptian Sinai will be any different.
No Israeli should have any illusion that any country other than Israel could prevent large-scale smuggling of weapons and people through Gaza's borders. No Arab, American, or international force has the stomach to take the abuse and suffer the casualties required to control the borders. If Israel doesn't control the borders, they will not be controlled.
Lack of serious control of Gaza's borders would have a major impact on Palestinian military and terrorism capabilities. Higher quality explosives, anti-tank weapons, anti-helicopter and anti-aircraft weapons, long-range mortars and short-range missiles, as well as advanced communication and surveillance equipment, are all small enough to smuggle through a not-too-assiduously controlled border.