Goldmanâs Gain, Americaâs Risk
July 14, 2009, 4:57 pm
By The Editors
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/goldmans-gain-americas-risk/
The headquarters of Goldman Sachs in Lower Manhattan.
Updated, July 14, 8:30 p.m. | Jeffrey A. Miron, an economist at Harvard, says this situation shows why governments should not be in the bailout business.
Having earned $3.44 billion in the second quarter, Goldman Sachs announced that it would be setting aside a compensation pool of $11.36 billion for the first half of 2009, or nearly $400,000 each, on average, for its roughly 29,400 employees and temporary workers. That level of per-worker compensation is close to what it was in mid-2007, when Wall Street was booming.
Many taxpayers might find the comeback of fat pay packages perplexing, especially since the federal government was throwing cash into the bank not that long ago. Is it reasonable to be critical of this kind of largess at Goldman when the rest of the economy is still floundering? Or is this a sign that the financial industry is stabilizing and that government aid is doing what it was supposed to do?
* William K. Black, economist, the University of Missouri
* Yves Smith, financial analyst
* Mark Thoma, economist, University of Oregon
* David Merkel, financial analyst
* Charles Geisst, author
* Jeffrey A. Miron, economist, Harvard University
A Poster Child for Financial Insanity
William K. Black
William K. Black, associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri, Kansas City, is a former financial regulator. His book, âThe Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One,â focuses on the role of âcontrol fraudâ in financial crises.
Itâs difficult to decide which is more insane: the efforts of the Bush and Obama administrations to recreate the failed financial markets, e.g., collateralized debt obligations that produced the worst global financial crisis in three generations, or continuing to make obscenely wealthy the financial idiot-savants that caused the crisis.
Goldman Sachs is the poster child for both forms of insanity. The news that Goldman has purportedly earned astonishingly large profits in the latest quarter and plans to pay many billions of dollars in âbonusesâ to people who are already in the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution raises issues in two categories: performance and pay.
Personally, Iâm more concerned by the performance. I care about pay primarily because it creates perverse incentives to engage in accounting/securities fraud and other forms of abuse. There are two possible explanations of Goldmanâs performance â and they are both frightening. âEconomic recoveryâ is not a possible explanation. Reports of âgreen shootsâ simply means that things are getting worse at a slower rate than six months ago. The recession, already our worst in modern history, is getting worse.
Goldman is the textbook case of âmoral hazard.â It recognizes that both administrations have guaranteed that it will not be allowed to fail no matter how badly it is run. (Treasury Secretary Geithner, in a portion of a speech ignored by the media, twice used the phrase âcapital insuranceâ to describe our new policy. The taxpayers no longer insure only depositors â we insure the shareholders, or more precisely, the senior officers.)
âMoral hazardâ is well known in insurance and economics. If there is little downside to the senior officers and if they can capture the upside, e.g., through massive bonuses, then it pays to either engage in ultra high-risk gambles, or the sure thing, accounting fraud. Either explanation is frightening because it is simply a matter of time before this strategy causes an even bigger financial crisis than this one.
Of course, you canât send out a memo to 10,000 employees and tell them explicitly to engage in either ultra high-risk strategies or accounting fraud. Thatâs the genius of bonus systems â you can send the same message without risk of prosecution. When the Business Roundtable was looking to respond to the Enron and WorldCom wave of âcontrol frauds,â they choose as their spokesman Franklin Raines, then chief executive of Fannie Mae. A reporter asked him why there were so many scandals on Wall Street. Mr. Raines replied:
âDonât just say: âIf you hit this revenue number, your bonus is going to be this.â It sets up an incentive thatâs overwhelming. You wave enough money in front of people, and good people will do bad things.â
Goldmanâs profits should teach us (1) that our policies are maximizing moral hazard, (2) at firms that pose a systemic risk to the entire economic system, and (3) changing executive compensation to minimize the perverse incentives is not âmerelyâ a matter of fairness â but essential to protecting ourselves from future crises.
A Benefit for the Few
Yves Smith has written the blog Naked Capitalism since 2006. She has spent more than 25 years in the financial services industry and currently is head of Aurora Advisors, a management consulting firm.
The size of the Goldman bonuses masks a more important issue, namely that the firm was in very dire shape not long ago and was saved from collapse by official intervention, not merely the Troubled Asset Relief Program, but a host of special facilities created by the Fed to direct liquidity to the very markets that firms like Goldman are deeply exposed to and depend upon for their business to be viable, let alone profitable.
Goldman was in such acute distress that, as The Financial Times reports today, Goldman senior officers sold nearly $700 million of equity from when Lehman failed through April, with the heaviest selling occurring when the firm was on TARP life support and while it was selling stock to the public. Put more bluntly, the executives were being cashed out by outside money.
Lest you have any doubts, the insiders sold far more shares than in the comparable period the year prior, when the firmâs stock was priced much higher. Goldman also received a capital injection from Warren Buffetâs Berkshire Hathaway shortly prior to the TARP funding. Needless to say, the terms Buffett got were vastly superior to the ones the taxpayer received.
The logic of these programs is that the big capital markets players have become such crucial parts of the economic infrastructure that they cannot be permitted to fail. Yet they continue to enjoy a grossly asymmetric deal, socialized losses versus privatized gains. The stunning magnitude of the Goldman bonuses shows whom this arrangement benefits, not the public at large, but a privileged few.
Returning to High-Risk Strategies
Mark Thoma is an economics professor at the University of Oregon and blogs at Economistâs View.
What does the size of Goldmanâs compensation pool tell us? It gives some indication that the financial sector is improving, and that is good news. Thereâs no guarantee, however, that the recovery of the overall economy will follow anytime soon. Even with improvements in the financial sector, the recovery of the broader economy is likely to be a slow process.
Thatâs because the economy cannot go back to where it was before the crisis hit. The financial and housing sectors need to shrink, too many economic resources were used unproductively in support of these activities, and the automobile sector is also in transition.
But getting smaller isnât enough. The financial sector also needs to change its ways so that accumulated risk does not threaten the financial system and the broader economy. As Robert Reich notes today, Goldmanâs chief financial officer tells Bloomberg News, âOur model really never changed, weâve said very consistently that our business model remained the same.â
That thinking is worrisome. Goldmanâs unexpectedly large earnings is a signal that some firms are returning to the same high-risk strategies â backed by âtoo big to failâ government guarantees â that got us into trouble in the first place. Apparently, the excesses that led to the high incomes of financial executives have not ended.
Are the profits and the bonuses justifiable compensation of executives for superior talent? Thatâs a legitimate question. Goldman was helped by bailout funds. Thereâs some debate about whether it actually needed a direct infusion of funds, but it certainly benefited when its counterparties such as A.I.G. were bailed out. It is also benefiting from its early escape from government constraints that still inhibit the ability of other firms to compete on equal footing.
The executive compensation structures provided bad incentives that were a big factor in the financial crisis. The size of Goldmanâs compensation pool shows this problem hasnât been fixed.
CONTINUED BELOW
July 14, 2009, 4:57 pm
By The Editors
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/goldmans-gain-americas-risk/
The headquarters of Goldman Sachs in Lower Manhattan.
Updated, July 14, 8:30 p.m. | Jeffrey A. Miron, an economist at Harvard, says this situation shows why governments should not be in the bailout business.
Having earned $3.44 billion in the second quarter, Goldman Sachs announced that it would be setting aside a compensation pool of $11.36 billion for the first half of 2009, or nearly $400,000 each, on average, for its roughly 29,400 employees and temporary workers. That level of per-worker compensation is close to what it was in mid-2007, when Wall Street was booming.
Many taxpayers might find the comeback of fat pay packages perplexing, especially since the federal government was throwing cash into the bank not that long ago. Is it reasonable to be critical of this kind of largess at Goldman when the rest of the economy is still floundering? Or is this a sign that the financial industry is stabilizing and that government aid is doing what it was supposed to do?
* William K. Black, economist, the University of Missouri
* Yves Smith, financial analyst
* Mark Thoma, economist, University of Oregon
* David Merkel, financial analyst
* Charles Geisst, author
* Jeffrey A. Miron, economist, Harvard University
A Poster Child for Financial Insanity
William K. Black
William K. Black, associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri, Kansas City, is a former financial regulator. His book, âThe Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One,â focuses on the role of âcontrol fraudâ in financial crises.
Itâs difficult to decide which is more insane: the efforts of the Bush and Obama administrations to recreate the failed financial markets, e.g., collateralized debt obligations that produced the worst global financial crisis in three generations, or continuing to make obscenely wealthy the financial idiot-savants that caused the crisis.
Goldman Sachs is the poster child for both forms of insanity. The news that Goldman has purportedly earned astonishingly large profits in the latest quarter and plans to pay many billions of dollars in âbonusesâ to people who are already in the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution raises issues in two categories: performance and pay.
Personally, Iâm more concerned by the performance. I care about pay primarily because it creates perverse incentives to engage in accounting/securities fraud and other forms of abuse. There are two possible explanations of Goldmanâs performance â and they are both frightening. âEconomic recoveryâ is not a possible explanation. Reports of âgreen shootsâ simply means that things are getting worse at a slower rate than six months ago. The recession, already our worst in modern history, is getting worse.
Goldman is the textbook case of âmoral hazard.â It recognizes that both administrations have guaranteed that it will not be allowed to fail no matter how badly it is run. (Treasury Secretary Geithner, in a portion of a speech ignored by the media, twice used the phrase âcapital insuranceâ to describe our new policy. The taxpayers no longer insure only depositors â we insure the shareholders, or more precisely, the senior officers.)
âMoral hazardâ is well known in insurance and economics. If there is little downside to the senior officers and if they can capture the upside, e.g., through massive bonuses, then it pays to either engage in ultra high-risk gambles, or the sure thing, accounting fraud. Either explanation is frightening because it is simply a matter of time before this strategy causes an even bigger financial crisis than this one.
Of course, you canât send out a memo to 10,000 employees and tell them explicitly to engage in either ultra high-risk strategies or accounting fraud. Thatâs the genius of bonus systems â you can send the same message without risk of prosecution. When the Business Roundtable was looking to respond to the Enron and WorldCom wave of âcontrol frauds,â they choose as their spokesman Franklin Raines, then chief executive of Fannie Mae. A reporter asked him why there were so many scandals on Wall Street. Mr. Raines replied:
âDonât just say: âIf you hit this revenue number, your bonus is going to be this.â It sets up an incentive thatâs overwhelming. You wave enough money in front of people, and good people will do bad things.â
Goldmanâs profits should teach us (1) that our policies are maximizing moral hazard, (2) at firms that pose a systemic risk to the entire economic system, and (3) changing executive compensation to minimize the perverse incentives is not âmerelyâ a matter of fairness â but essential to protecting ourselves from future crises.
A Benefit for the Few
Yves Smith has written the blog Naked Capitalism since 2006. She has spent more than 25 years in the financial services industry and currently is head of Aurora Advisors, a management consulting firm.
The size of the Goldman bonuses masks a more important issue, namely that the firm was in very dire shape not long ago and was saved from collapse by official intervention, not merely the Troubled Asset Relief Program, but a host of special facilities created by the Fed to direct liquidity to the very markets that firms like Goldman are deeply exposed to and depend upon for their business to be viable, let alone profitable.
Goldman was in such acute distress that, as The Financial Times reports today, Goldman senior officers sold nearly $700 million of equity from when Lehman failed through April, with the heaviest selling occurring when the firm was on TARP life support and while it was selling stock to the public. Put more bluntly, the executives were being cashed out by outside money.
Lest you have any doubts, the insiders sold far more shares than in the comparable period the year prior, when the firmâs stock was priced much higher. Goldman also received a capital injection from Warren Buffetâs Berkshire Hathaway shortly prior to the TARP funding. Needless to say, the terms Buffett got were vastly superior to the ones the taxpayer received.
The logic of these programs is that the big capital markets players have become such crucial parts of the economic infrastructure that they cannot be permitted to fail. Yet they continue to enjoy a grossly asymmetric deal, socialized losses versus privatized gains. The stunning magnitude of the Goldman bonuses shows whom this arrangement benefits, not the public at large, but a privileged few.
Returning to High-Risk Strategies
Mark Thoma is an economics professor at the University of Oregon and blogs at Economistâs View.
What does the size of Goldmanâs compensation pool tell us? It gives some indication that the financial sector is improving, and that is good news. Thereâs no guarantee, however, that the recovery of the overall economy will follow anytime soon. Even with improvements in the financial sector, the recovery of the broader economy is likely to be a slow process.
Thatâs because the economy cannot go back to where it was before the crisis hit. The financial and housing sectors need to shrink, too many economic resources were used unproductively in support of these activities, and the automobile sector is also in transition.
But getting smaller isnât enough. The financial sector also needs to change its ways so that accumulated risk does not threaten the financial system and the broader economy. As Robert Reich notes today, Goldmanâs chief financial officer tells Bloomberg News, âOur model really never changed, weâve said very consistently that our business model remained the same.â
That thinking is worrisome. Goldmanâs unexpectedly large earnings is a signal that some firms are returning to the same high-risk strategies â backed by âtoo big to failâ government guarantees â that got us into trouble in the first place. Apparently, the excesses that led to the high incomes of financial executives have not ended.
Are the profits and the bonuses justifiable compensation of executives for superior talent? Thatâs a legitimate question. Goldman was helped by bailout funds. Thereâs some debate about whether it actually needed a direct infusion of funds, but it certainly benefited when its counterparties such as A.I.G. were bailed out. It is also benefiting from its early escape from government constraints that still inhibit the ability of other firms to compete on equal footing.
The executive compensation structures provided bad incentives that were a big factor in the financial crisis. The size of Goldmanâs compensation pool shows this problem hasnât been fixed.
CONTINUED BELOW