Global Macro Trading Journal

Quote from Daal:

darkhorse,
you seem to trade completely differently from me and most people who stock pick. You use technicals plus stops. I can't follow Einhorn purely without understading the thesis completely and agreeing with it because I will have no staying power. Volatility would shake me out, also he wont tell me when he is out, what he thinks of the news, earnings etc. Following stock tips without understanding and agreeing with the thesis is just a fast way to a poor house and in order to understand the thesis I will have to have experience in that sector.

I'm not sure it requires much additional research once the initial trade thesis has been presented, all you need is to verify the thesis. For example in 2007 I googled and found some analysis on the Florida-exposed real estate plays, from a real estate lawyer, of all people. It took me about a day to go through the accounts quickly and find out that his picks (stuff like CORS, WCI etc) had i) huge exposure to S Fla ii) high leverage; and that was all you needed to know to realise they were going to get totally screwed if the macro call (housing bust) was right.

Proper 'trader analysis' focuses on 'what matters' - i.e. what is going to dominate the fortunes of the stock. Usually that is not the minutiae of the company accounts, because the inefficiency is in the market not understanding the macro. However, broad company exposure to macro is definitely something any trader can figure out by doing a little research, and riding the coat-tails of analysts.

As for holding on, and conviction - doing the accounts analysis doesn't help, because you can get the macro wrong (e.g. Einhorn and Loeb in 2008), and accounts are never a 100% accurate picture (see JPM :D). Conviction is somewhat tenuous even on the best trades.

So, you simply have to structure trades and position management strategies that handle this uncertainty. Long-dated options are a good way to play it, so is booking some profits (or hedging with options) into extreme strength or weakness and strong crowd emotion/headline frenzy.
 
Quote from darkhorse:

See meng, you gotta get de funnamenals first.

Den when you getta funnamenals, you gotte get de price action.

Den when you gotta price action, den you get de profit.

Dats why you gotta make your own moves.

Lmao! Funny and true :D
 
Quote from darkhorse:

See meng, you gotta get de funnamenals first.

Den when you getta funnamenals, you gotte get de price action.

Den when you gotta price action, den you get de profit.

Dats why you gotta make your own moves.

print and frame...:p
 
Quote from darkhorse:

Well you're right about that... there are so many instances of major moves where a position "acts right" the entire time, either on the way up or the way down, that I don't see the point of holding a position through meaningful price action adversity.

Good point. A classic example was AAPL over the last few years, it was continually acting stronger than the overall market, and apart from the flash crash it didn't have any bearish price action. A long AAPL/short SPY position (full or partial hedge) was even better from a risk/reward perspective. AAPL also had nice valuation. I think it was Jim Leitner who said that the best trades have a strong fundamental story, favourable price action, AND favourable valuation - those are pretty rare in my experience.

Perhaps now would be an appropriate time to start talking about the best way to scan for such opportunities? This is a self-confessed weakness of mine, I always seem to have a shortage rather than a surplus of really top quality ideas where the price is also acting right. For example at the moment I'd say Zillow is fitting this pattern on fundamentals and price action (although the valuation is not favourable), and it's no surprise to see SAC in on the action. Still, it's a very volatile stock and a close trailing stop is unlikely to work well.

The only time I can/will hold through adverse price action is where the value is so compelling, and the fear so rampant, that I'm more scared of missing the rebound than I am of taking a big hit. Needless to say, this can only be done on a portion of total capital, stuff you can lock up for 2-3 years and not flinch if it drops 50% because you are willing and able to buy more. In fact, averaging in over 3-6 months is probably best, unless your bottom-picking skills are superlative. This only happens in really market or stock panics though. Greece would be my candidate for the next example of this.
 
Quote from Ghost of Cutten:

I think it was Jim Leitner who said that the best trades have a strong fundamental story, favourable price action, AND favourable valuation - those are pretty rare in my experience.


Michael Marcus, original Market Wizards. Fundamentals, technicals and sentiment (market tone) -- if those three are in your favor, it's like pocket aces preflop. You're not 100%, but it's about the best you'll get.


Quote from Ghost of Cutten:


Perhaps now would be an appropriate time to start talking about the best way to scan for such opportunities? This is a self-confessed weakness of mine, I always seem to have a shortage rather than a surplus of really top quality ideas where the price is also acting right.

Technical screeners as initial starting point to uncover interesting movements. If a stock sees significant range expansion on significant volume, for example, there is a fundamental reason why it happened. Something may have sea changed, in terms of sentiment, valuation moving forward, or underlying situational dynamics.

Minervini, SMW, the "price action sandwich." Price, then fundamentals, then price again. Macro trading works this way too. Charts tell you the general positioning of the world; then you investigate interesting pockets and corners; then price action is your trigger for actual buys and sells.

Pay attention to movement in the same way a predator instinctively watches movement (i.e. screen for it, make note of it); investigate the movement as a starting point for fundamental confirmation; when you get fundamental confirmation, back to price action again.
 
Quote from darkhorse:

Stocks don't just drop 50% randomly, and shorts don't just double randomly, any more than a girlfriend turns randomly psycho. There are underlying accessible factors, warning signs there, and with reasonable diversification you can survive the adverse gaps and actually benefit from the ones that go in your favor. (Which will tend to happen more often, actually, if you are generally positioned correctly.)

Yes, but the ones that can go psycho are often the most fun and 'interesting' - no risk, no reward :D

I agree with your general point, but don't forget I was advocating sector baskets (as opposed to 1 or 2 stocks) also. I accept the points about shitty ETF construction, but you can solve that by creating your own ad-hoc ETF by just buying the top 5-10 stocks in the industry. The essential difference is do you drill down and pick 1 or 2 stocks, or do you just make the macro call and then pick up broad-based exposure to the sector without doing heavy research into them.

What you said about the oil sector is actually a great example of what I'm talking about - going long a basket of oil stocks made actually more than buying BP, at considerably less risk. Even the smart Dan Loeb play of buying Anadarko bonds (IIRC) was arguably not so much better that it was worth the average trader's time to study, versus just buying the OIH ETF. Most traders aren't good bond analysts.

Also, the single stock risk is real. Although it's rare, sometimes you do get a black swan with no realistic way to anticipate it. So if you are picking 1-3 oil stocks, you will be taking on more black swan risk than a broad basket, which inhibits the ability to be aggressive.
 
Quote from ralph00:


If you think there's some sort of iron ore bubble that's popped and will hit the Oz mining industry, short a mining industry company. If you think the banking industry is going to have funding issues, short a bank.

Better to short a basket of miners/banks. Much less risk, much less research ability required, and not much less reward to be gained. If you were saying that only ONE miner or bank was a great play, I would agree with you. But if its the sector, then play the sector. If it's the economy, play the index. Match exposure as tightly as possible with the alpha-generating theme, but no tighter.

Here's how I would summarise it:

Great single stock insight (e.g. AAPL the last few years, or your NLY pick): trade the single stock.

Great sectoral insight (oil stocks in summer 2010): trade a sector basket (not 1-2 stocks, not an index).

Great economy insight (US 2008/09; PIIGS 2010-12): trade the asset class (stock index, bond futures, currency, whatever)

Great timing as well: trade the options.

P.S. As for the broad index in this case - Oz has a housing bubble as well as a mining boom, and the former has been mentioned on this thread (as well as AUD shorts). If commodities/China go, so does housing, so does banks, so does the index (and currency). That's why Daal was mentioning index plays, I assume.
 
Quote from Ghost of Cutten:

Nice debate on broad vs specific exposure. Allow me to provide a more specific example of the benefits of simplicity vs complex/targeted exposure. A good illustrative example was commodities and financials during the 2007-09 bear market. Financials rolled over a lot earlier than the general market, and were down huge in 2007, whereas commodities kept going great guns up to H2 2008. Some made very nice returns in 2007 to mid 2008 by a simple long commodities short financials spread, whilst the S&P was not down that much. For example, from the Oct 2007 peak, XLF fell 1/3 up to early July 2008, whereas the RJI commodity ETF rallied 40% over the same period - a 73% return on the spread trade. The spread then lost 43% in the next 7 trading sessions, mainly due to a huge 35% bear market rally in the XLF.

In individual stock names it was even more extreme. Fannie Mae went up 170% in those 7 days, despite being ultimately destined for $1 per share and below.

By contrast, SPY rallied 7.6% during that period.

So, let's compare the total return to max drawdown ratio of all these plays:

i) simple bear play - short SPY from peak (Oct 2007) to trough (March 2009). Total return: approx 55%. Max DD: 27%. Ratio: 2:1

ii) sectoral bear play - short XLF from peak to trough. Total return: 85%. Max DD: 60%. Ratio: 1.42:1

iii) stock-specific bear play - short FNM and LEH from peak to trough (I am being favourable to stockpicking here by choosing 2 ideal shorts that went to zero or near enough to it). Total return: 99%. Max DD: 120% (this DD took place in 3 trading sessions, lol). Ratio: 0.825:1

iv) long/short thematic play - I already showed the results from short XLF long RJI above. Unless you somehow ran the trade for 1 year then exited near the peak, you were looking at making about 1:1 return to max drawdown here, maybe up to 1.5 if you were nimble.

So, let's compare the stock-picking thesis against this data. The two most perfectly selected shorts of the greatest crisis of the modern era; the best long/short 'market neutral' sectoral macro spread play during that time; a more basic targeted sector short in financials; and a simple plain vanilla short SPY, which would have taken all of 2 seconds to analyse. Note that these are all picked with 20/20 hindsight, which gives a huge artificial benefit to the stockpicker thesis - in reality there's a very real risk that your stock or sector picks actually suck or just perform in line with the sector or market, yet with far more risk. So, these results make the stockpicking approach look better than it really is.

Now, if the 'stockpicking is optimal, simplistic bets are lazy' theory is correct, what would you expect? The stock shorts, after extensive research, should have provided the best return to risk ratio. The spread trade should have provided the 2nd best R/R ratio, as it was hedged against most grey swans and caught the weakest and the strongest sectors in the market over that period. The targeted XLF short should have been the 3rd best, and the boring, lazy, simple SPY short should have provided the worst returns relative to risk.

What actually happened? The complete opposite! Boring, lazy short SPY had a fantastic 2:1 R/R ratio, not to mention the least exposure to grey/black swans.

Relatively simple short XLF made 1.55 times more than short SPY but at the cost of a monster 60% drawdown over twice as big as that in the overall market. SPY was superior on a R/R basis by a factor of over 1.4.

The spread play turned out to be a Texas hedge, dropping 42% in a week and a half while the market only budged 7.5% i.e. it was *at least* 6 times riskier than simple short SPY, yet made only 1.3 times as much - in other words, it was a shittier trade by a factor of 4.5 times.

And the perfect short - two individual stocks falling 99-100% each and ending on the pink sheets within a year - well, quite apart from the buttock-clenching 120% 3 day face-melting sucker rally (and another near 100% spike in Spring 2008, again taking only a few trading sessions), if you somehow managed to hold onto your shorts, then you made less than your risk. You dropped 120% to make a 0.85 R/R ratio, comapred to dropping 27% in SPY to make a 2:1 R/R ratio. This makes the stock-specific ideal shorts a worse R/R trade by a factor of 10.5.

So...plain SPY short was the best trade, and over ten times better than the ideal 2 stock short play. The simplest trade had the best R/R ratio and the lowest outright risk. Each additional layer of complexity made things worse.

Clearly, the only way to really earn superior returns by stockpicking here was to buy puts on the short plays (or buy CDS as Einhorn did). But, did Einhorn make 55% on capital with his Lehman play? No he didn't - in fact he was down substantially in 2008. He got the stock pick right but got hosed because he got the big picture call totally wrong.

Now, as darkhorse rightly points out, occasionally you get a flat market where one or two sectors or stocks are on fire. But you also get flat markets where the same sectors or stocks get hammered. Is anyone really nimble enough to switch between the two? Maybe. But on this occasion we were talking about an obvious macro play (shorting an index), versus a complex riskier one (shorting 2 stocks with more specific exposure). The 2008 example shows that the latter might not just take more time and effort, but is quite likely to provide more outright risk and a significantly inferior R/R ratio. That is why simple exposure should never be dismissed as the inferior, lazy trader's option. There is much virtue in simplicity.

In my opinion, stockpicking is best for when there is little or no macro opportunity. You can't earn alpha by big picture calls in a quiet market, and by having a long/short trading book you are earning alpha on both sides whilst massively reducing risk (and you can still dial in the index exposure of your choice via futures). But when you have a slam dunk macro call, the argument for stockpicking is weaker than you would expect.

I would say the best use of stockpicking in big macro plays is for finding the best asymmetric payoffs via options, CDS, and (to some extent) spread plays for their lower overall market risk (although you have to watch out for when these become crowded and start turning into Texas Hedges). Those make more sense to me for targeted exposure than just shorting the stocks themselves. Another lesson from 2008 is that getting the macro right and then finding & picking the best trading vehicle (financial/RE CDS positions) earns a heck of a lot more than just getting the macro right (short SPY).

Summary - simple broad exposure is a very robust, low risk, and surprisingly attractive play. Doing a bit more legwork to pick specific sectors or stocks might actually backfire due to the huge increase in risk. Probably the best play is to pick not just the stocks but the best trading vehicles for them. I personally would prefer the bulk of my exposure in a broad index or (if its just a sector that's going to move) sector ETF, and then a few small speculative asymmetric bets on targeted individual stocks which best express the macro view.

Comparing shorting Fannie Mae or Lehman in 2008 vs. SPY with shorting BHP or WBC in 2012 vs. EWA ... well, it's not only not in the same ballpark, it's not in the same league, it's not even in the same f-ing sport (thank you Q.T.).

As for a basket, that's fine - pick the big miners or big banks in Oz and short 'em all. But - getting back to how this started - to say "Hmm, Oz is in trouble," and just blindly short EWA makes no sense.
 
Quote from Ghost of Cutten:

I'm not sure it requires much additional research once the initial trade thesis has been presented, all you need is to verify the thesis. For example in 2007 I googled and found some analysis on the Florida-exposed real estate plays, from a real estate lawyer, of all people. It took me about a day to go through the accounts quickly and find out that his picks (stuff like CORS, WCI etc) had i) huge exposure to S Fla ii) high leverage; and that was all you needed to know to realise they were going to get totally screwed if the macro call (housing bust) was right.

Proper 'trader analysis' focuses on 'what matters' - i.e. what is going to dominate the fortunes of the stock. Usually that is not the minutiae of the company accounts, because the inefficiency is in the market not understanding the macro. However, broad company exposure to macro is definitely something any trader can figure out by doing a little research, and riding the coat-tails of analysts.

As for holding on, and conviction - doing the accounts analysis doesn't help, because you can get the macro wrong (e.g. Einhorn and Loeb in 2008), and accounts are never a 100% accurate picture (see JPM :D). Conviction is somewhat tenuous even on the best trades.

So, you simply have to structure trades and position management strategies that handle this uncertainty. Long-dated options are a good way to play it, so is booking some profits (or hedging with options) into extreme strength or weakness and strong crowd emotion/headline frenzy.

Sure sometimes the homework can be done faster but in this particular case I'd argue the bulk of the 'edge' lies on the correct macro call that Florida RE was bust instead of the micro analysis of the companies(The most levered companies would likely go up more if the macro thesis was incorrect, they likely had a higher beta), I'm not sure it was stock picking that created the EV there

The reason I was defending indexing its because I've been too many times in the position of seeing stock presentations done by investors with great track records where I didn't understand terms or things they were explaining because I'm not in that field. I started to research about it and it just took more and more of time. Sometimes you spend a full day or 2 and come to the conclusion that its too uncertain and it will require even more time to have confidence there. At this point I decided I will only take the easy plays and index the rest

As you point out there is the added benefit that the drawdowns are likely to be smaller enabling one to take a larger position(Which is correct from a optimal F/math perspective due smaller worst loss)
 
I'd point out one more thing. When my homework in a specific stock is very quick usually I'm going to be wrong(That is, the stock will underperform the index even if I make money).
This is because markets tend to be efficient with obvious stuff, using a simplistic analysis of 'hey the PE ratio is low' most of the time will get one burned, all one has to do is too look at studies done by Fama and French on stock picking, most of the top performers have returns that are not different from what you would expect from chance plus most of that ones that are not in the top, underperform the index

These people that underperform the index are all familiar with popular strategies like PE ratios, etc. If I want to outsmart them in excess of my costs of trading I will have to know something unusual about the stock that they don't, most of the time this will require time, extensive research etc. Guys like Ackman are experts on this, they will do a ridiculous amount of research, going down to even obscure levels of the US tax code in order to know how it would impact EPS. Their homework is so deep it gets to the point of its effect being similar as trading on inside information, it gives them an edge. I don't have an interest(nor capital) to do this kind of research(specially when the knowledge can't be used again soon)

The exception is when we are talking about mispricing due human flaws(Like BP in 2010 during the panic) in that case I usually do minimal work because I know WHY I'm outsmarting the other participants(I believe I'm less flawed than then)
 
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