This is crap. The role in the financial crisis of government incentives, put in place many years earlier, to get banks to lend more in depressed areas, to minority start-ups etc. has been looked at very carefully. It played no significant role whatsoever in the financial crisis. The driving force behind the liar loans and other abuses was demand for mortgages to securitize. Investment banks could not get their hands on new mortgages fast enough to satisfy the demand created by those same banks for CDOs via ratings manipulation. CDOs were, for a time, selling like hotcakes. The popularity of CDOs in turn resulted in a glut of mortgage money. There weren't enough qualified borrowers, so the banks looked the other way as mortgage processors lowered standards to rock bottom to keep raking in fees and supplying mortgages to the banks.
If you want to put the blame on any one individual it's Greenspan, not Frank, you should pinpoint. Greenspan knew about excesses in the mortgage industry, and as chief regulator it was up to him to see that underwriting standards were tightened up. He did nothing. He did not believe in regulation. He thought markets, if left alone, would self-correct more or less harmlessly. He has said publicly that his biggest mistake was believing that Bankers would not act against their own best interests. Apparently Greenspan never got as far in his appraisal of the situation as "too big to fail."
Piezoe,
Hey there ole buddy. It's been a while.. I do agree with what you are saying. I was at Countrywide (left 2007) right before they went under. And, I saw borrowers wanting more money. On a few occasions, I tried talking customers out of taking the loans. But, they wanted money to pay off their credit cards and buy things they couldn't afford. In their thinking they would come back in a couple of years and do it again. I try not to point the figure on any one person or organization because everyone played a part. As you said.. from the gov "equal housing" to the Fed provisions to the bankers making easy money to investors pushing the paper on secondary markets all the way to the customer. And, I agree. If Greenspan didn't see it or refused to see it.. then how was anyone else to see it. The few that did see it made mad cash during the collapse.
How did we get from Soros to all this? I like to read Soros. It's an interesting perspective. I particularly like how he disagrees with the mainstream ideas that academia pushes on efficient market hypothesis (I'm referring to his ideas on market 'reflexivity'). What are your thoughts?