Quote from Ricter:
They weren't even in the game until it was nearly up, and their contribution was small. The private sector owns 95% of this.
Edit: Will's long been an idiot, beholden to a certain constituency, so all reason has to be tortured to satisfy them. Lately, he has been moving left a bit, the data being hard to argue with. At any rate, if he's implying that the solution to (let's change terms to illustrate) the wrong medicine is no medicine, then he's an idiot.
Edit: Ok, the actual percentage is about 83.
"Here's a fresh reminder from Forbes Magazine (of all places) as to who the real villains are in the current recession:
" It is clear to anyone who has studied the financial crisis of 2008 that the private sectorâs drive for short-term profit was behind it. More than 84 percent of the sub-prime mortgages in 2006 were issued by private lending. These private firms made nearly 83 percent of the subprime loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers that year. Out of the top 25 subprime lenders in 2006, only one was subject to the usual mortgage laws and regulations. The nonbank underwriters made more than 12 million subprime mortgages with a value of nearly $2 trillion. The lenders who made these were exempt from federal regulations."
I agree with your views on the bailouts, and moral hazard, with a small caveat having to do with the difference between the subprime lenders and "bank".
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And this too. So easy to blame the minorities or the low income people to feed hate.
"For example, if the CRA was to blame, the housing boom would have been in CRA regions; it would have made places such as Harlem and South Philly and Compton and inner Washington the primary locales of the run up and collapse. Further, the default rates in these areas should have been worse than other regions.
CRA were less likely to default than Subprime Mortgages â Source: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
What occurred was the exact opposite: The suburbs boomed and busted and went into foreclosure in much greater numbers than inner cities. The tiny suburbs and exurbs of South Florida and California and Las Vegas and Arizona were the big boomtowns, not the low-income regions. The redlined areas the CRA address missed much of the boom; places that busted had nothing to do with the CRA.
snip
Nonbank mortgage underwriting exploded from 2001 to 2007, along with the private label securitization market, which eclipsed Fannie and Freddie during the boom.
Check the mortgage origination data: The vast majority of subprime mortgages â the loans at the heart of the global crisis â were underwritten by unregulated private firms. These were lenders who sold the bulk of their mortgages to Wall Street, not to Fannie or Freddie. Indeed, these firms had no deposits, so they were not under the jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp or the Office of Thrift Supervision. The relative market share of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dropped from a high of 57 percent of all new mortgage originations in 2003, down to 37 percent as the bubble was developing in 2005-06.
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Nonbank mortgage underwriting exploded from 2001 to 2007, along with the private label securitization market, which eclipsed Fannie and Freddie during the boom â Source: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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â¢Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards. Taking up that extra share were nonbanks selling mortgages elsewhere, not to the GSEs. Conforming mortgages had rules that were less profitable than the newfangled loans. Private securitizers â competitors of Fannie and Freddie â grew from 10 percent of the market in 2002 to nearly 40 percent in 2006. As a percentage of all mortgage-backed securities, private securitization grew from 23 percent in 2003 to 56 percent in 2006
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Subprime Lenders were (Primarily) Private
Only one of the top 25 subprime lenders in 2006 was directly subject to the housing laws overseen by either Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or the Community Reinvestment Act â Source: McClatchy
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These firms had business models that could be called âLend-in-order-to-sell-to-Wall-Street-securitizers.â They offered all manner of nontraditional mortgages â the 2/28 adjustable rate mortgages, piggy-back loans, negative amortization loans. These defaulted in huge numbers, far more than the regulated mortgage writers did.
Consider a study by McClatchy: It found that more than 84 percent of the subprime mortgages in 2006 were issued by private lending. These private firms made nearly 83 percent of the subprime loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers that year. And McClatchy found that out of the top 25 subprime lenders in 2006, only one was subject to the usual mortgage laws and regulations.
A 2008 analysis found that the nonbank underwriters made more than 12 million subprime mortgages with a value of nearly $2 trillion. The lenders who made these were exempt from federal regulations."
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2011/1...ow-the-facts-of-the-economic-crisis-stack-up/