Final Round Hedge Fund Interview Question

A couple of suggestions. First, see a recent presentation by Netflix about the future of their own business, which includes the following chart:

<img src=http://www.elitetrader.com/vb/attachment.php?s=&postid=2874759>

As you can see, their business is still growing, and will not start to decline for two or three more years. The complete presentation is available here:

http://techcrunch.com/2010/06/03/netflix-business/

Second, go the Value Investors Club and see the analysis of Netflix from 2007, which was well done. As discussed therein, Netflix has several competitive advantages:

1. First-mover advantage – Netflix pioneered the online DVD rental model in September 1999 and faced no serious competition until August 2004, when Blockbuster launched its online DVD rental program. That gave Netflix a five-year lead in establishing its brand and creating a first-class consumer experience. Netflix has been rated the #1 website for customer satisfaction in the past four semi-annual surveys by ForeSee Results and FGI Research. By way of contrast, anecdotal evidence suggests that Blockbuster Online’s website is clumsier and less intuitive. Netflix’s early start also has provided an edge in collecting the largest number of subscriber-generated movie reviews and ratings (over 1.7 billion), which contributes to making Netflix the most user-friendly service for finding content.

2. Barriers to entry – Online DVD rental has become a two-pony race between Netflix and Blockbuster. As of year-end 2006, Blockbuster had 2.2 million online subscribers versus Netflix’s 6.3 million. That puts the current online market share at 74% Netflix, 26% Blockbuster. As recently as two years ago Wal-Mart was a competitor, and Amazon was making rumblings about entering the online DVD rental market as well. But in May 2005, Wal-Mart discontinued its DVD rental service and handed over its subscribers to Netflix in exchange for Netflix’s agreement to promote Wal-Mart’s DVD sales. Similarly, Amazon never entered the market, probably in part because it saw how Blockbuster had to spend roughly $300 million during 2004 and 2005 just to scrape together a distant second place to Netflix. The fact that Netflix successfully warded off both Wal-Mart and Amazon speaks to the significant barriers to entry that now exist in the online DVD rental business. I estimate that today the minimum cost of entry for a new competitor would likely be north of $500 million in order to build a network of nationwide shipping centers, run a huge advertising campaign, and endure deep losses while scaling up to a level of critical mass.

3. Low-cost provider – This one is a bit more difficult to prove objectively because Blockbuster’s financials reflect a hybrid of online and offline operations, making it impossible to compare BBI and NFLX’s cost structures on an apples-to-apples basis. Nevertheless, the simple fact that Blockbuster must support a costly base of physical stores, while Netflix does not, supports the rationale for believing that Netflix’s costs are structurally lower than that of Blockbuster. Netflix’s CEO Reed Hastings has asserted, “Our scale and technology allow us to make money at price points no competitor can sustainably match” (Q3 ’05 earnings call).

4. Long-tail economics – I’m using this label to describe the unique nature of Netflix’s emphasis on lesser-known titles and independent films, which collectively are referred to as “long-tail” content. This term comes from a November 2005 article in Wired Magazine describing the long-tail phenomenon which is relevant to numerous internet business models. The long tail represents the thousands of niche interests and pockets of consumer demand – each one tiny on its own and therefore too small to be a target of traditional mass-market merchandising – but the collective whole of these niches represents a large market. For Netflix, the long-tail phenomenon is visible in its users’ viewing habits in that only about one-third of Netflix’s rentals are new releases, while the other two-thirds are older films, foreign titles, or independent content. This is exactly the opposite of traditional video stores which are primarily reliant on the new release slate. (Envision your typical video store where people are roaming the perimeter for new releases, while practically nobody ventures into the middle of the store.)

Netflix’s system of personalized recommendations plays a key role in driving demand across the full breadth of its DVD library. In fact, every three months, Netflix members rent more than 95% of the 70,000 titles in the Netflix library. This ability to connect subscribers to long-tail content is, most significantly, a vital source of competitive differentiation. There are many alternative channels for new release and pop hit content – including traditional video stores, video on demand, mass market retailers, and DVD self-rental kiosks – but long-tail content is nearly impossible to access economically except by online DVD rental. Netflix’s ability to tap into long-tail economics is a vital source of competitive differentiation that the market is clearly underrating.
 

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How about this Jim Chanos is currently shorting NetFlix and thinks that they are still delivering when they should be examining the wave of the future of straight digital delivery. they will soon be competing with the movie studios as well as the likes of hulu and amazon.

Also blockbuster may be down and out but they have a formidable opponent in RedBox which offers $1.00 a day rentals that are convenient because they are located at McDonalds and grocery stores.

Jim Chanos is the Warren buffett of short selling who got his name shorting an insurance company in the 80's and true notoriety with the ENRON call way before everybody else. (watch the smartest guys in the room quite comical)

I can go on and on while I may not be as good as you analytically and just graduated last year and am a prop at a hedge fund down here in boca raton feel free to hit me up on facebook as I would love to discuss more instead of typing it here on the 4th of July.

-Richart Ruddie
 
An idea might be sell upside calls on the underlying, while purchasing CDS for the longer term, so the trade finances itself. Given the moribund outlook for the Market over the next 6 mths, it seems like an easy trade.

If the CDS are not liquid, then jan 11 95 puts look like a decent option to buy with the call money...
 
Or you could do a pairs trade here. Who are their potential competitors? Amazon definitely comes to mind. Amazon is streaming digital movies along with so many other areas they are experiencing growth.

How about a Netflix short and an Amazon long? Or long Amazon with NFLX puts, or sell NFLX calls while buying Amazon calls...there are so many ways you could go with this.
 
Tell the hedge fund to abandon this value investing non-sense and buy a decent high-frequency trading firm that can collect the rebates or spread all day long on NFLX. :-)
 
I picked up a copy of "financial shenanigans" 3rd edition the other day, and low and behold - PG. 220-224 discusses a peculiar accounting trick that Netflix uses to record the purchasing of inventory and how it is in contradiction to the statement of cash flows....

take a look, the book is well worth buying
 

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OP:

If you really, really want to make an impression with your new firm tell them that at the end of the presentation or rapport it does not matter what you or anybody else think about the investment to make.

The only thing that matters is what you are going to do when you are in a position after the research. How to unwind an investment that is not producing or how to maximize a winning position is the only thing where there is control over. Al the research and idea's are just that. Research and idea's. It comes down to what you think will happen and when you take action on that, then you think you have some sort of control, while in reality you are playing a probability game that can go either way...
 
Quote from psytrade:

I picked up a copy of "financial shenanigans" 3rd edition the other day, and low and behold - PG. 220-224 discusses a peculiar accounting trick that Netflix uses to record the purchasing of inventory and how it is in contradiction to the statement of cash flows....

take a look, the book is well worth buying
The book has exceptionally high rating among amazon customers...
 
First, this probably isn't the best place to ask this type of question.

With that as a preface, though, my best guess is that they are testing your quality of thought and how well you back-up your reasoning. It's probably best to go with what your analysis shows and try to be as convincing as possible with that. You also better have answers to every conceivable question they might ask.


Quote from quin8670:

Hey Guys,

I have a final round interview at a hedge fund coming up and they asked me to make a presentation on NFLX and make a long/short recommendation on the stock and bonds.

I am much more familiar with valuing equities than bonds.

The NFLX bonds are rated BB and mature in 2017 with YTM around 8% and a coupon of 8.5%.

NFLX doesn't have a large amount of tangible assets so for the bonds to be redeemed in 2017 the company must still be in existence for bond holders to get their investment back. Now the company is doing very well but there is still some uncertainty given that the industry is moving towards a pure online streaming model and other competitors will likely try to enter this market (there are already competitors but larger competitors that are very tech savvy with deep pockets could enter). My question is, do most hedge fund high yield bond groups look for an investment like this? I thought most were more interested in distressed debt or in debt where they know the company has assets with real value that will ensure they get their investment back. The yield is fairly attractive assuming the company survives, but the company is just a middle man without a significant amount of tangible assets. Would it be ludicrous for me to make a recommendation saying to neither buy nor sell the bonds?

Also, I'm going to do a quick DCF model (haven't done it yet) just to see how many subscribers and how much rev per subscriber they would need to justify their current valuation (I will do some sensitivity analysis as well). My guess is that my analysis will shows that the stock is grossly overvalued. However, I usually shy away from shorting stocks with good fundamentals. Do you think they are looking for someone to actually make a long/short call as opposed to saying to just avoid it? Are most hedge funds willing to short NFLX? In prior interviews they have said they are a shop that doesn't worry about daily p/l and can take a longer term approach and some heat on some of their positions.

If my analysis shows the stock is overvalued do you think it makes sense for me to give a short recommendation? Just wondering if they are looking for guys to actually make calls as opposed to guys who always find the negatives and risks and don't make many calls.
 
Quote from Ghost of Cutten:

Overvaluation by itself is not sufficient reason to short a stock. And NFLX is not overvalued unless you are darn sure their earnings aren't going to keep growing at a rapid pace.

As for the bonds - it's a poor investment to lend a company like this money at 8%. If you are going to take the risk of a high growth company, generally it's best to do so in the stock so if you are right you make a high return. In the bonds if you are right you make 8%- whoopee do. If you are wrong you lose 50%+.

IMO the best answer here is to say that neither asset is a slam dunk long or short. No position in either of those two assets has a wide margin of safety.
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Great post!

Great thread!
 
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