Quote from Debaser82:
Today, in a similar fashion, the seeds of Depression are sown in China. Economists hail the growth of China, many not realizing that China is undergoing an inflationary credit boom that dwarfs that American one during the roaring â20s. According to official government statistics, 2002 Chinese GDP growth was 8%, and 2003 growth was 8.5%, and some analysts believe these numbers to be conservative. According to the Peopleâs Bank of China own web site (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/baogaoyutongjishuju/), âMoney & Quasi Money Supplyâ for 2001/01 was 11.89 trillion, for 2002/01 was 15.96 trillion, for 2003/01 was 19.05 trillion, and for 2004/01 was 22.51 trillion yuan. In other words, money supply for 2001, 2002, and 2003 grew respectively 34.2%, 19.3%, and 18.1%. Thus, during the last three years, money supply in China grew approximately three times faster than money supply in the U.S. during the 1920s.
No wonder the Chinese stock market has been booming and the Chinese real estate market is on fire. Just like the U.S. in the 20s, China finances today foreign countries, mostly the U.S., by buying U.S. government bonds with their trade surplus dollars. Just like the Fedâs failed attempts of moral suasion during the 20s, the Chinese government today similarly attempts in vain to curtail growth of credit by providing it only to those industries that need it, that is, only to industries that the government endorses for usually political reasons. Also, for most of the current boom, Chinese consumer prices have been mostly tame and even falling, while prices for raw commodities have been skyrocketing, which perfectly fits the Austrian view that prices of higher-order goods, such as raw materials, should rise relative to prices of lower-order goods, such as consumer goods. This indeed confirms that credit expansion has already been in progress for a considerable time, and that inflation now is in an advanced stage, although it has not yet reached a runaway mode. Thus, economic conditions in China today are strikingly similar to those in America during the 1920s, and the multi-year credit expansion implies that a bust is inevitable.
http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/petrov/2004/0902.html
What was wrong with his analysis from 2004 and why has the bust not yet occured?
The analysis essentially misses that most Chinese did not preticipate in the Chinese economy as end consumers until the 2000s, and the Chinese internal money supply was tiny in relation to it's population.
The US bust of 29 was caused by a burst stock bubble that made a cadre of people suddenly without a large portion of their "wealth", and over indebted consumers not being able to make their loan payments, which caused bank failures.
The threat to China is not consumer indebtedness but that the sudden drop in export revenue may cause China to collapse.
Their only hope against a fall in export demand to maintain production levels and employment is to develop a robust internal economy within China, and I think the Chinese money supply has had to grow substantially for this to occur without internal price deflation for finished goods.