POLITICIANS HAVE difficulty learning from their mistakes; it’s tough enough to just acknowledge them. Admitting mistakes leaves elected officials feeling exposed and vulnerable. And why bother, when the partisan divide encourages both sides to endlessly litigate the rights and wrongs of past legislative choices?
Cash for Clunkers should be the exception. Enacted in 2009, the $3 billion program was intended to stimulate the economy by offering $4,500 credits for trading older vehicles for newer, more fuel-efficient cars. It was a spectacular failure, at least according to two comprehensive studies. The first was completed last year by the Brookings Institute, a left-leaning Washington think tank. Another, conducted by Texas A&M researchers, was released recently by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
excellent work on the subject four years ago.
Meanwhile, if you want to better understand how poor public policy happens, it goes something like this.
First, get caught up in the hoopla. Clunkers produced the type of headlines that politicians dream of: helping people buy cars, better fuel efficiency, the promise of job creation, and the word “cash” in the title. (Spelled with a $, if you please.) It was full of the kind of vague simplicity that has great political appeal, but begins to disintegrate as soon as it comes into contact with the real world.
Second, ignore the reality and complexity of human behavior. Proponents never seriously considered that subsidies would appeal most to consumers who were already considering replacing their vehicles. Both studies showed conclusively that the short-term spike in sales simply represented transactions that were pulled forward in time. Legislators’ belief that a temporary $4,500 rebate would result in sustainable sales growth was wrong from the start.
were convinced to throw away $2 billion more on top of the initial $1 billion program.
Time and again, legislators based their assumptions on hopes and aspirations — what they wanted to happen — rather than honest economic or empirical analysis. It’s a recipe for failure, but one used by Congress many times before. Recent news coverage of laws that encourage illegal immigration, create incentives for overutilization of the health care system, or reward colleges for promoting student debt are driven by similar faulty assumptions about economics and human behavior.
The overall lesson is simple enough: Leave predictions and manipulation of human behavior to the psychologists. Using taxes and rebates to control, coerce, and alter individual actions is inefficient, wasteful, and fraught with unintended consequences.
Cash for Clunkers should be the exception. Enacted in 2009, the $3 billion program was intended to stimulate the economy by offering $4,500 credits for trading older vehicles for newer, more fuel-efficient cars. It was a spectacular failure, at least according to two comprehensive studies. The first was completed last year by the Brookings Institute, a left-leaning Washington think tank. Another, conducted by Texas A&M researchers, was released recently by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
excellent work on the subject four years ago.
Meanwhile, if you want to better understand how poor public policy happens, it goes something like this.
First, get caught up in the hoopla. Clunkers produced the type of headlines that politicians dream of: helping people buy cars, better fuel efficiency, the promise of job creation, and the word “cash” in the title. (Spelled with a $, if you please.) It was full of the kind of vague simplicity that has great political appeal, but begins to disintegrate as soon as it comes into contact with the real world.
Second, ignore the reality and complexity of human behavior. Proponents never seriously considered that subsidies would appeal most to consumers who were already considering replacing their vehicles. Both studies showed conclusively that the short-term spike in sales simply represented transactions that were pulled forward in time. Legislators’ belief that a temporary $4,500 rebate would result in sustainable sales growth was wrong from the start.
were convinced to throw away $2 billion more on top of the initial $1 billion program.
Time and again, legislators based their assumptions on hopes and aspirations — what they wanted to happen — rather than honest economic or empirical analysis. It’s a recipe for failure, but one used by Congress many times before. Recent news coverage of laws that encourage illegal immigration, create incentives for overutilization of the health care system, or reward colleges for promoting student debt are driven by similar faulty assumptions about economics and human behavior.
The overall lesson is simple enough: Leave predictions and manipulation of human behavior to the psychologists. Using taxes and rebates to control, coerce, and alter individual actions is inefficient, wasteful, and fraught with unintended consequences.

