Quote from mickson:
Your assessment of the money management landscape seems pretty accurate to me.
We have a simple value proposition. Emerging managers often find it difficult to attract capital, either because the assets they are managing are too small for the bigger guys to consider them or they just don't have a network of any sorts.
RAPA is proposing to consider managers that typically wouldn't qualify for the regular database services or the 3PM crowd. We have put our money where our mouth is and seeded the initial allocations $1.3m. This is modest in comparison to the size of the hedge/CTA industry and the seeding of better known managers. It's at least a start.
Frankly, the share split should be the least concern of these managers; if they are not growing their assets under management a 90% or 100% cut of zero isn't that attractive. If they are growing their assets without us then they don't need us or they may only want to use us for access to a capital source that they couldn't tap.
What we will need to do as a company is prove through time that our mechanism of evaluating managers/traders is different (superior) from the commodity like databases out there. We believe we have something special and we will need to convince investors to trust our seal of approval of a particular manager. As we convince more people we will have more capital to allocate and hopefully continue to attract managers with unique undiscovered skills.
This is not a short term solution. We have been successful as a group seeding some major Australian managers and we hope to replicate that success on a global stage.
But your business model doesn't make sense. There are really only three possibilities. Let me explain...
1) You are investing your own capital
The split should be 80:20. You keep 80% of gains and managers keep 20%. This is what you'd be getting if you approached a firm like mine with a good history and impressive returns. So if that is the case, why would you ever consider a 50/50 rev split? In this case you, as the investor, are giving up far more than you should.
2) You are replicating a feeder fund or fund of funds model.
Similar to above, the split should be 80/20 of new net profits. On top of that, as the feeder fund manager, you'd charge either a flat 1-2% or a 10% incentive fee on new net profits. In this case, under your fee structure, the investors are treated fairly in that they still get the bulk of new net profits, but the managers are getting screwed. Your charge as basically a FoF should be on top of the managers' fees, not as a draw against their fees.
3) You are running a listing database with capital allocation services.
In this case you aren't really providing much more than barclayhedge, IASG, etc... You have a proprietary ranking system, but other than that the only difference is that you seem to be taking over the allocation of capital from the investors. This would make you fall more into the realm of a transparent FoF, except that you are charging your fee to the managers instead of the investors.
It seems to me that your intended business model is #3. Let me explain why this is actually bad for the investors. Managers with less than $1MM AUM are inherently MUCH more risky than more established firms. There is truly no way to tell if they'll be able to scale (both mechanically and mentally). If they had a proven track record, there would be no reason to come to you in the first place.
But your fee structure is so unfair for them, that you'll be constantly pushing out the best managers and again exposing your investors to risky unknowns. Even if a guy like me a couple years ago would've used your site to get started, after about a year or so I'd have had the track record and AUM to get rid of you and there is no way I'd try to keep your investment if it still carried a 50% rev split. I have to assume that you have a non-circumvent or procedure that doesn't allow a manger to go around you to the investor.
IMO, it is just a bad business model for you, the managers, and the investors.
YOU are doing all the work of a FoF only to constantly lose your best funds.
MANAGERS are getting ripped off.
INVESTORS are exposed to high risk and unnecessary turnover, ultimately losing access to the best managers.
Everyone would be better served if you just started an FoF that targeted start-up managers, charging a reasonable fee structure so that when you found the superstars you could keep them and allow your investors to reap the rewards.