By 2008, Lehman had assets of $680 billion supported by only $22.5 billion of firm capital. From an equity position, its risky commercial real estate holdings were thirty times greater than capital. In such a highly leveraged structure, a 3 to 5 percent decline in real estate values would wipe out all capital.
(
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lehman_Brothers#Rise_of_mortgage_origination_(1997–2006) )
One measure of this risk-taking was its leverage ratio, a measure of the ratio of assets to owners equity, which increased from approximately 24:1 in 2003 to 31:1 by 2007.
[3] While generating tremendous profits during the boom, this vulnerable position meant that just a 3–4% decline in the value of its assets would entirely eliminate its book value of equity.
[4] Investment banks such as Lehman were not subject to the same regulations applied to depository banks to restrict their risk-taking.
[5]
(
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bankruptcy_of_Lehman_Brothers#Exposure_to_the_mortgage_market )