so maybe 'no inkling' is going a little far
Quote from ZZZzzzzzzz:
You did not answer the question, of course...
Drinking the Bush Kool Aid does that to folks like you...
Quote from Pabst:
To me inkling= information. Did any EVIDENCE of a terror plot involving U.S. airliners filter up to the WH? No.
Quote from Avid_Consumer:
no problem, we can go with that. the fact is they certainly had an inkling
What evidence were Clinton and Clarke working off of when Clinton put US airports on maximum security in 1998? Can one attribute that to good intuition?
Quote from Arnie:
Unlike you, I'm not drinking anything. You would rather argue semantics and parse sentences than face the facts. Bush took action after 911. Except for bombing an aspirin factory, Clinton took no action after at least 3 attacks during is EIGHT YEARS in office. It really is that simple.
Quote from hapaboy:
Clinton cited Richard Clarke over and over during the interview, and said that he ""left a comprehensive anti-terror strategy" for incoming Bush officials when he left office.
So let's hear what Clarke had to say about this:
Wednesday, March 24, 2004
WASHINGTON â The following transcript documents a background briefing in early August 2002 by President Bush's former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to a handful of reporters, including Fox News' Jim Angle. In the conversation, cleared by the White House on Wednesday for distribution, Clarke describes the handover of intelligence from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration and the latter's decision to revise the U.S. approach to Al Qaeda. Clarke was named special adviser to the president for cyberspace security in October 2001. He resigned from his post in January 2003.
RICHARD CLARKE: Actually, I've got about seven points, let me just go through them quickly. Um, the first point, I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration.
(Furthermore, to Clinton's claim the Bush Administration "did nothing"):
Richard Clarke: Over the course of the summer â last point â they developed implementation details, the principals met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold, changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance.
]And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al Qaeda over the course of five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al Qaeda. That is in fact the timeline.
QUESTION: When was that presented to the president?
CLARKE: Well, the president was briefed throughout this process.
QUESTION: But when was the final September 4 document? (interrupted) Was that presented to the president?
CLARKE: The document went to the president on September 10, I think.
QUESTION: What is your response to the suggestion in the [Aug. 12, 2002] Time [magazine] article that the Bush administration was unwilling to take on board the suggestions made in the Clinton administration because of animus against the â general animus against the foreign policy?
CLARKE: I think if there was a general animus that clouded their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing with terrorism issue. This is the one issue where the National Security Council leadership decided continuity was important and kept the same guy around, the same team in place. That doesn't sound like animus against uh the previous team to me.
JIM ANGLE: You're saying that the Bush administration did not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was making these decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased money for covert action five-fold. Is that correct?
CLARKE: All of that's correct.
ANGLE: OK.
QUESTION: Are you saying now that there was not only a plan per se, presented by the transition team, but that it was nothing proactive that they had suggested?
CLARKE: Well, what I'm saying is, there are two things presented. One, what the existing strategy had been. And two, a series of issues â like aiding the Northern Alliance, changing Pakistan policy, changing Uzbek policy â that they had been unable to come to um, any new conclusions, um, from '98 on.
QUESTION: Was all of that from '98 on or was some of it ...
CLARKE: All of those issues were on the table from '98 on.
ANGLE: When in '98 were those presented?
CLARKE: In October of '98.
QUESTION: In response to the Embassy bombing?
CLARKE: Right, which was in September.
QUESTION: Were all of those issues part of alleged plan that was late December and the Clinton team decided not to pursue because it was too close to ...
CLARKE: There was never a plan, Andrea. What there was was these two things: One, a description of the existing strategy, which included a description of the threat. And two, those things which had been looked at over the course of two years, and which were still on the table.
QUESTION: So there was nothing that developed, no documents or no new plan of any sort?
CLARKE: There was no new plan.
QUESTION: No new strategy â I mean, I don't want to get into a semantics ...
CLARKE: Plan, strategy â there was no, nothing new.
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,115085,00.html
Quote from Pabst:
On December 4, 1998, the Clinton administration received a President's Daily Brief entitled "Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks."