The rapid unravelling of Archegos has led to scrutiny of its relationships with its prime brokers. Goldman and Morgan Stanley led a distressed stock-selling spree of almost $20bn of Hwang’s investments on Friday. Credit Suisse, Nomura and UBS could attempt to offload billions more in stocks this week.
The great unravelling was triggered when Archegos defaulted on margin calls — orders to add cash or collateral to their broker accounts — after a slump in some of its securities. This prompted the banks to liquidate their positions to reduce their exposure to the stocks.
The sell-off has so far impacted nine companies: Baidu, Tencent Music, Discovery, Farfetch, GSX Techedu, Shopify, Vipshop, iQIYI and ViacomCBS. Banks put colossal blocks of the securities
up for sale — the largest collection in at least a decade, according to one analyst note.
Derivatives dealings
How was Hwang able to build such large stakes in companies and remain largely undetected? The answer lies in a type of financial instrument called total return swaps.
Also known as contracts-for-difference, swaps are derivatives that allow investors to pay a fee and in turn receive cash based on the performance of an underlying asset. The bank owns the underlying security and in the event of any losses, payments are due from the hedge fund to the bank.
Swaps have boomed in popularity but have been criticised as they allow investors to amass stakes in companies without disclosing their holdings the way they would have to do with equity stakes of a similar size. They are often used by activist funds to disguise their positions as they build positions in target companies.
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Archegos transacted almost exclusively in total return swaps, said several people familiar with the fund’s operations. And it further magnified its footprint by holding the swaps with multiple banks.
Prime brokerages may have not been aware of the extent of their own exposure to Archegos or being racked up at rival banks, said a number of people involved.
“The reality is that prime brokers are still piecing it all together,” said one trader, hours after the block trades first started to hit the market.
Others disputed this. “It’s inconceivable that we loaned him so much or that we were not aware of the other banks’ positions,” said an executive at a bank with billions of dollars of exposure to Archegos.
Fewer than 10 banks racked up more than $50bn of credit exposure to Archegos, said people familiar with the matter.
One Hong Kong-based investor said: “Did any bank know how big this fund was getting and how leveraged it really was? If they did know, why were they still lending at such aggressive terms?”
A number of the banks were lending to Archegos so that it was as much as eight times levered, meaning for every one stock the fund bought, the bank would lend it seven more, according to people familiar with the matter. In some trades, leverage ratios may have hit as high as 20 times, one person with knowledge of the fund said.
It meant that Archegos was able to accumulate large, debt-fuelled positions without either publicly disclosing the positions or owning the underlying security.
“If you’re holding everything as swaps, the reality of what you have to declare to your banks is very little,” said one hedge fund executive with knowledge of trading the instruments.
Despite the limited disclosure, the Archegos affair raises questions about banks’ risk management, which is likely to attract the attention of regulators.
“It’s not so much the quantum of the bank’s lending that is the issue, it’s whether the bank believed it had appropriately hedged itself and whether it was comfortable in the collateral it had taken for the loan in a potential liquidation scenario,” said a senior Wall Street trader.
An executive at a large broker said: “This is why the big banks all blew themselves up in 2008 — over-the-counter derivatives with leverage via a prime broker. Banks are better capitalised now, so this shouldn’t kill any one of them, but it will ruin people’s party and reawaken the regulators.”
One Tokyo-based banker familiar with the situation said: “You get a pretty good understanding of the general situation around Hwang, and the kind of calculations these prime brokers were all making about risk and reward when you look at the way Goldman behaved.”
For years the hedge fund manager was blacklisted by the US bank, which “felt like a no-brainer considering Hwang’s reputation. Then suddenly they are doing everything they can to get him as a client and lend him money,” the banker added.
“So it’s greed trumping fear, right until that stopped last week.”
Additional reporting by Laura Noonan in Dublin
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