Quote from rodden:
For live spot quotes, charts, articles, etc. - go to 'kitco.com'. Be forewarned - this site is very bullish on gold.
You don't say
Anyway, I was doing some homework over the weekend - info.goldavenue.com seems to be a very informative site
I think I "get" the CB gold leasing now - it seems identical to the stock loan business.
1) Long term holders (CBs) lease gold to earn a carry yield
2) The demand for borrowable gold comes from banks like JP who provide hedging solutions for producers
3) Producers want to hedge in a falling price environment
The irony of the situation is unlike the stock loan business, the volume of gold short sales to facilitate hedges is probably a very significant proportion of gold liquidity. In the stock world, all the hedge related short sales in the market don't add up to much of a price impact because the "normal" trades are so much larger in liquidity.
So, CBs and producers appear to have been caught in a classic price spiral trap. CBs lend gold to earn a yield on an otherwise non-yielding instrument. Producers are sold on hedging strategies by banks and start to lock in prices not only on near term production but future production.
When you start selling forward 3-4 years worth of future production in the spot market, the banks are going to be shorting a significant proportion of the daily liquidity. This causes prices to go down, which causes producers to panic and lay on heavier and heavier hedge programs. Which in turn results in greater price pressure downwards.
Ordinarily, the circuit breaker in such a vicious cycle is the stock of borrowable inventory. But since a great deal of gold is hoarded rather than consumed (wheat gets eaten, copper goes into cables etc), you have multiple years worth of gold production sitting in inventory to facilitate forward sale programs.
I think the producers were caught in a classic prisoners dilemma trap and could not dig themselvers out of it (hedge or not hedge?). In a falling price market, you would expect producers to cut production relative to demand, which is exactly what happened with gold producers and certainly explains the growing gold output gap between production and demand.
Central banks woke up to this vicious cycle after the Bank of England's announcement to sell gold in Oct 1999 crushed the price of gold. So, they banded together to limit gold leasing and gold sales in Dec 1999, in behaviour reminiscent of other production limiting cartels.
It seems clear that CBs now want to talk up the price of gold because they have wisened up and want to get a good price for their sales. They are clearly still dishoarding down to the minimum level of gold required to perform a disaster insurance policy function described by the Banque de France. There seems to be no official interest in restoring gold to a monetary function (despite interesting precedence - Mexico, India and Brazil have in the past 10 years settled international obligations with gold).
Long, long term, the value of gold is largely derived from its perceived value as a money substitute. It remains to be seen if it can sustain that without the support of the central banking instutitions.