For the record, unemployment peaked in 1982, and the peak rate (about 11%) corresponded with the beginning of the new secular bull. See attached chart.
That being said, I agree that many things appear to be worse now than in the 1970's, particularly when you think in terms of the likelihood for expanding credit. Household balance sheets are destined to delever for some time.
But the main point of this thread, I would reiterate, is given by an earlier post:
"It seems to be the case that, in times such as these, the problem is that certain themes are so visible, so forceful on the intellect, so easy to articulate, that it's almost impossible to see anything else. And, every time a new age of growth develops, it is based on a reorganization of ideas and capital that could not have been foreseen from the fog-of-war of the preceding consolidation phase.
Hence, the abstract principle is that we will probably find a way to work out the seemingly insurmountable problems and get on with improving our lot. The point of the chart is that we seem to go through periods when we doubt that this is plausible. And that that doubt seems to have a relatively identifiable structure when seen from a bird's eye view."
I guess I am inclined to believe that the hardest things to see are the least quantifiable. Like the fact that, in the end, the economy is made of a bunch of intelligent agents who want things to be good. Eventually, that force seems to get traction when least expected and the quantifiable themes change qualitatively.
I'm sure it was an easy sell in 1938 or 1975 (or indeed, 1982) to say that the obstacles to future prosperity were insurmountable.
That prosperity seems, by all extrapolatable trends, to be implausible is, I think, one of the defining qualities of any such period. At least, that's the thesis I'm running with right now.
That being said, I agree that many things appear to be worse now than in the 1970's, particularly when you think in terms of the likelihood for expanding credit. Household balance sheets are destined to delever for some time.
But the main point of this thread, I would reiterate, is given by an earlier post:
"It seems to be the case that, in times such as these, the problem is that certain themes are so visible, so forceful on the intellect, so easy to articulate, that it's almost impossible to see anything else. And, every time a new age of growth develops, it is based on a reorganization of ideas and capital that could not have been foreseen from the fog-of-war of the preceding consolidation phase.
Hence, the abstract principle is that we will probably find a way to work out the seemingly insurmountable problems and get on with improving our lot. The point of the chart is that we seem to go through periods when we doubt that this is plausible. And that that doubt seems to have a relatively identifiable structure when seen from a bird's eye view."
I guess I am inclined to believe that the hardest things to see are the least quantifiable. Like the fact that, in the end, the economy is made of a bunch of intelligent agents who want things to be good. Eventually, that force seems to get traction when least expected and the quantifiable themes change qualitatively.
I'm sure it was an easy sell in 1938 or 1975 (or indeed, 1982) to say that the obstacles to future prosperity were insurmountable.
That prosperity seems, by all extrapolatable trends, to be implausible is, I think, one of the defining qualities of any such period. At least, that's the thesis I'm running with right now.
Between a complete overhaul of the global monetary system and the de-colonization of the planet's #1 energy source, the structural changes were deep and dramatic.
