You're ridiculous, jem, you didn't even read Fauci's Testimony that you quoted.
I'll post it again for you here. Please read it. All of it. Do you think that if we don't fund and do this research that no one else will?
TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY S. FAUCI, M.D.,\1\ DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES
Dr. Fauci. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Collins. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the
NIH mission of performing biomedical research for the purpose
of preparing for and responding to naturally emerging and
reemerging infectious diseases and the relationship of this
type of research to biological security.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Fauci with attachments appear in
the Appendix on page 34.
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As you mentioned in your statement, the issue at hand is
the ongoing threat of the emergence of an H5N1 pandemic
influenza and the research that was supported by the NIH to
address this threat. The publication of the results of such
research in the form of the two manuscripts that you mentioned
has focused considerable public attention on the issue of dual-
use research, namely research that is directed at providing new
information critical to the public health, but at the same time
has the potential for malevolent applications.
My written testimony is submitted for the record, and in my
few minutes of time, I will highlight just a few important
aspects of this issue.
First, the public health challenge. Seasonal influenza is
an ongoing threat to public health worldwide and is among the
leading global causes of death due to infectious diseases. Each
year, influenza causes more than 200,000 hospitalizations and
up to 49,000 deaths in the United States and up to a half-a-
million deaths globally. Yet influenza has animal reservoirs,
especially in birds, and these viruses can undergo extensive
genetic changes and jump species, resulting in an influenza
virus to which humans are highly vulnerable.
Such an event can and historically has led to global
disasters, such as the one you mentioned, the prime example
being the 1918 global influenza pandemic that killed up to 100
million people worldwide and caused enormous social and
economic disruption. There is a clear and present danger that
we will have another influenza pandemic, since these viruses
continue to circulate in the world and are constantly evolving
toward pandemic capability, as we have seen in 1957, 1968, and
2009.
Over the last decade, a highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza
has emerged among chickens. Rarely, the virus spreads to
humans. Since 2003, approximately 600 confirmed cases have
occurred in humans in more than a dozen countries shown in red
on this poster.\1\ Nearly 60 percent of those reported cases
have resulted in death. Should the virus mutate to transmit
more efficiently to and among people, a widespread influenza
pandemic could ensue.
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\1\ The poster referenced by Dr. Fauci appears in the Appendix on
page 48.
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Indeed, nature itself is the most dangerous bioterrorist,
and even as we meet today, H5N1 and other influenza viruses are
naturally mutating and changing with the potential of a
catastrophic pandemic. This is not a theoretical danger. It is
a real danger.
For decades, NIH has supported basic influenza research
included on transmissibility, host adaptation, and virulence.
The goal is to anticipate what the virus is continually trying
to do on its own in the wild and to prepare for it. Such goals
were pursued by the NIH-funded scientists Kawaoka and Fouchier
and could have important positive implications for pandemic
influenza prediction, prevention, diagnosis, and treatment.
Kawaoka and Fouchier constructed variants of H5N1 avian
influenza in order to identify which genetic mutations might
alter the transmissibility of the virus. In their studies, they
employed a standard influenza animal model, namely the ferret.
This poster shows the basic design of the experiments,\2\ in
which the virus was modified to allow for aerosol transmission
from one ferret to another.
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\2\ The poster referenced by Dr. Fauci appears in the Appendix on
page 50.
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I might point out that one of the causes of the public
misunderstanding was the widespread belief that the virus that
was transmitted by aerosol from one ferret to another actually
killed the ferrets when, in fact, that was not the case.
We feel that these studies provide critical information and
it was important to determine if H5N1 virus that has this
enhanced transmissibility would remain sensitive to existing
anti-influenza drugs and vaccines. In addition, and
importantly, knowledge of the genetic mutations that facilitate
transmission may be critical for global surveillance of
emerging influenza viruses.
Yet since transmissibility of a virulent virus was
increased, this constitutes dual-use research of concern
(DURC), which is shown on this poster.\1\ If a particular
research experiment is identified as DURC, that designation
does not necessarily mean that such research should not be
published, nor should it even be prohibited in the first place.
However, it does call for us, as you mentioned, to balance
carefully the benefit of the research to the public health, the
biosafety and biosecurity conditions under which the research
is conducted, and the potential risk that the knowledge gained
from such research might fall into the hands of those with ill
intent.
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\1\ The poster referenced by Dr. Fauci appears in the Appendix on
page 51.
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In this regard, the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity was asked to advise the U.S. Government on the
publication of these manuscripts. You will hear in detail from
Dr. Paul Keim, the Chair of that group, about the Board's
deliberations. Importantly, the public attention and concern
generated by this issue has triggered a voluntary moratorium or
pause on this type of research on the part of the influenza
research community as well as a fresh look at how the U.S.
Government handles DURC, as manifested by a formalization of a
government-wide policy to address the issue.
This policy, which was released on March 29, strengthens
and formalizes ongoing efforts in DURC oversight and is
described in my written testimony. The ultimate goal of the NIH
in its embrace of this new policy is to ensure that the conduct
and communication of research in this area remain transparent
and open at the same time as the risk-benefit ratio of such
research clearly tips towards benefitting society.
The public, which has a stake in the risks as well as in
the benefits of such research, deserves a rational and
transparent explanation of how these decisions are made. The
upcoming dialogue related to this policy certainly will be
informative and, hopefully, productive in its goal of
benefiting the public with the fruits of such research while
ameliorating the associated risks. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Dr. Fauci. That was
an excellent introduction to the topic and I look forward to
asking you some questions.
