Quote from Robert A. Green:
We need rock solid examples of how this so called "tiny tax" puts active traders out of business. My Forbes editor thought I was not credible when I wrote that and he rejected my FTT petition on my Forbes blog. Please get me the numbers I need to lay this out for people clearly. Thanks.
Using the ES (S&P mini) futures contract as an example:
ES futures contract value assumed for this example = 1400.
A good short-term ES futures trader can make an average of $30-50 profit (before expenses) per-contract per-trade over the long run. Commissions plus other expenses (hardware/software/bandwidth/development/data/research/education/etc.) can run easily $5-10 per contract per round-trip trade (Commissions alone run $3-4). That leaves $20-45 profit per-contract per-trade on which the trader then pays federal and state income taxes.
What happens when we add the "tiny" FTT?
The Defazio-Harkin bill (.03%) would place a $42 transaction tax on each round trip contract. The Ellison bill (.05%) would place a $70 tax per round trip.
The FTT wipes out most, if not all, short-term futures traders.
Another thing to keep in mind is that the transaction tax applies to losing trades as well as winning trades, turning a losing streak into huge capital drawdown, thereby greatly increasing the risk per trade while decreasing the per-trade returns. Even if someone could manage to make a small profit per trade, the capital requirements to withstand the drawdowns would be prohibitive for many independent traders (and in most cases the small returns wouldn't be worth the large risk even if the capital was available).
Perhaps some other futures traders could share their experiences.
It would be great if some of the stock and bond traders could provide examples of how the FTT would effect their P&L.