Quote from Moneyball:Sure, but the public won't care if it destroys us
Ms. Public has little to say in things requiring international coordination (and G7 won't do here, Mr Brown - see the Simon Johnson's interview: "if they do it at the full G20 level, they may get some traction". The IMF would not be easily persuaded by appeal to authority and high-pressure techniques (so do not fear those celebs). They need rational arguments, some decent number crunching, they would even select your most math-ridden stuff that you send them (have you tried BTW?) You see, Sir, advice, however good, is almost costless

And we can always do both - crunch numbers for the IMF and educate the public at the same time (incl. US Congressmen) using e.g. Wikipedia, as some of us have been doing... If we have no time or indeed skill for it, then we should at least hire someone. They certainly did hire someone - Boyd Reimer is their full-time content shifter! If left for a month or so unopposed, he will eventually remove each and every anti-tax argument... as he did before we showed any interest in this most visited and linked page on the trans-tax in the world...
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Tobin_tax&action=history
Here's his latest removal:
Reason for removal of Keynes personal life info
Note to the person who added info about Keynes personal life:
Not myself, but a different editor, cautioned us about the length of this article. (see this edit)... This Wikipedia policy on article size states that if an article is too long then some personal computers experience technical difficulty in opening it. That's why editors should be aware of "priorities of relevance" even in footnotes. I propose that information about Keynes personal life is not relevant enough to the Tobin tax to be included. I suggest that this content would be more appropriate in a different article in Wikipedia, perhaps in the article on Keynes himself.Boyd Reimer (talk) 12:51, 24 January 2010 (UTC)
And to undersdand why the fragment was removed, just have a read:0
While proposing to tax others (Americans), Mr Keynes himself enjoyed speculation to the fullest, running an early precursor of a [[hedge fund]]. As the Bursar of the Cambridge University King's College, he managed two investment funds, one of which, called Chest Fund, invested not only in the then 'emerging' market US stocks, but also periodically included commodity futures and foreign currencies, albeit to a smaller extent (see Chua and Woodward, 1983) . His fund achieved positive returns in almost every year, averaging 13% p.a., even during the Great Depression, thanks to very modern investment strategies, which included inter-market [[diversification]] (i.e. invested not only in stocks but also commodities and currencies) as well as [[shorting]], i.e. selling borrowed stocks or futures to make money on falling prices, which Keynes advocated among the principles of successful investment in his 1933 report ("a balanced investment position [..] and if possible, opposed risks.") According to Ziemba and Ziemba (2007) Keynes risk-taking reached 'cowboy' proportions, i.e. 80% of the maximum rationally justifiable levels (of the so called [[Kelly criterion]]), with overall return [[volatility]] approximately 3 times higher than the stock market index benchmark. Such levels of volatility, responsible for his spectacular investment performance, would be achievable today only through the most aggressive instruments (such as 3:1 leveraged [[exchange-traded fund]]s). His pronouncements on the speculation-curbing transaction tax should be therefore taken as merely [[normative]] ideas, good for others, but not for himself. He instead chose modern [[speculation]] techniques practiced today by [[hedge funds]], which are quite different from the simple [[buy-and-hold]] long-term investing. (SEE BELOW TWO FOOTNOTES)</ref><ref>Chua, J. H. and R. S. Woodward, 1983. The investment wizardry of J. M. Keynes. Financial Analysts Journal 39 (3), 35-37, URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4478643</ref><ref>Ziemba, Rachel and William Ziemba, 2007. Good and Bad properties of the Kelly criterion" in: Ziemba R. and W. Ziemba, 2007, "Scenarios for risk management and global investment strategies", John Wiley & Sons, p. 29-31.</ref>
I guess it took the author some time and research before he could discredit their chief scientist so spectacularly

And now this splendid example of 'tu quoque' is gone forever... so I'm preserving it at least here
