Here is an article going into some detail about the history of the tax.
http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/6062A8E3B6C9C7C5852574800
For readers with a historical bent, it's worth recalling that the federal government -- as well as several states -- has repeatedly imposed a tax on the sale or transfer of securities. The first stock transfer tax can be traced to the early Republic, and it reappeared during the Civil War and the Spanish-American War. In 1914, faced with yet another military conflict, Congress again turned to the stock transfer tax. But this time the levy remained on the books for more than 50 years.
The Revenue Act of 1914 levied a tax of 2 cents per $100 of par value on all sales or transfers of stock. The tax was designed principally to raise revenue, not regulate markets. But that didn't stop advocates from predicting that it would also curb speculation.
The tax survived World War I and went on to raise considerable revenue in the bull market of the 1920s. In 1928 Democratic congressional leaders tried to reduce it, suggesting that current rates were unnecessary and excessive. But progressive leaders in both parties rejected the move, complaining that it would encourage speculation. They found surprising but crucial support in the person of Sen. Reed Smoot, a fiscal conservative who supported the transfer tax as a revenue measure. Ultimately, according to historian Cedric B. Cowing, nonfinancial business interests rallied to the cause, preferring the transaction tax to more onerous revenue alternatives.
In 1932, as lawmakers were casting about for ways to raise new revenue in the face of a Depression-spawned deficit, they slated the stock transfer tax for a big increase. Wall Street leaders complained that any hike would be ruinous, and they deployed a variety of arguments to bolster their case. Stock purchases were not speculation, they insisted. And even if they were, it was Ok, because speculation was good for the economy and the nation. And in any case, it was impossible to tell the difference between investment and speculation, so better to leave well enough alone.
Lawmakers were unconvinced, and the Revenue Act of 1932 more than doubled the rates. But Treasury experts remained lukewarm. In general, the tax probably made the revenue system more progressive, concluded economist Carl Shoup in a key 1934 study. But it didn't raise a lot of money, and it probably couldn't be made to produce much more. "Except as a check on speculative activity the tax probably has little to justify it," he wrote. Worse yet, it did a poor job of curbing speculation. "At present rates it probably does not check the kind of speculative activity -- the reckless, foolish activity -- deplored by those who would like to use the tax for this end," he wrote.
Nevertheless, the stock transfer tax remained on the books for another 32 years, disappearing only in 1966 when lawmakers repealed it as part of a broader effort to streamline the tax system. Few observers mourned its passing.
The idea remained dormant until the late 1980s, when both Democrats and Republicans began to ponder its potential. The stock market crash in 1987 had revived interest in the antispeculative potential of financial transaction taxes. Prominent economists published a flurry of papers on the topic, giving it intellectual currency for a few years.
Even more important, however, a federal budget crunch sent politicians in both parties scrambling for new revenue. Speaker of the House Jim Wright offered his support for some sort of financial transaction tax, chiefly as a revenue tool. Even the Treasury Department was reportedly considering it, which at least one observer found amusing. "A securities transfer tax, deliberately designed to create friction in the wheels of commerce, is a strange bird to be hatched by a Republican administration," wrote Washington Post columnist Michael Kinsley in 1990.
Indeed it was. But antispeculation sentiment runs strong in Washington, at least every once in a while. And when juxtaposed with a revenue crunch, it can be a powerful force for innovation. That might be an idea worth watching.